

# **WAR OF PERCEPTIONS: INTEGRATING INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTO PEACEKEEPING PLANS**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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Infantry**



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
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## **Abstract**

**WAR OF PERCEPTIONS: INTEGRATING INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTO PEACEKEEPING PLANS** By Major John W. Charlton, USA, 73 pages.

US military forces are conducting peace operations more frequently than ever before. Commanders in peace operations are faced with the dilemma of having to provide stability and security in an environment where the use of force is severely restricted. That problem, combined with potential adversaries that may not follow internationally recognized laws of warfare, could leave peace operations forces at a distinct disadvantage. Information operations provide a way for commanders of peace operations to combat this dilemma and meet mission objectives. This monograph analyzes how information operations (IO) can assist commanders and planners at the operational level of war in executing peace operations. It will answer the question, what role can IO play in a peace operation and how can planners at the operational level integrate information operations into their overall plan?

In answering this research question, this monograph will first analyze peace operations as they relate to the physical, moral and cybernetic domains of conflict. Using examples from recent and ongoing peace operations, this analysis will demonstrate that commanders and staffs must consider more than the just the physical domain when planning a peace operation. The analysis will then shift to how the elements of operational design relate to peace operations. Finally, this monograph will address the specific requirements for integrating IO into the overall plan by analyzing staff organization requirements and IO functions in a peace operation.

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## **1. Information Operations and Peacekeeping**

*"Our mission is to create an environment for resettlement..."*

*CPT Larry Harrison, CDR I Troop, 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR, Bosnia-Herzegovina<sup>1</sup>*

### **Stabilization Amidst Fear, Hatred and Nationalism**

Second platoon, I Troop, 3/2<sup>nd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) plan their patrol routes for the evening. They will focus their presence around the homes of three Moslem families that have resettled in Stari Rasadnik- the families' hometown before the war in Bosnia started. Now, however, Bosnian Serbs control the town and Second Platoon must ensure violence doesn't break out during the resettlement.<sup>2</sup>

This area's population used to consist of a Moslem plurality but fell into Bosnian Serb control following bitter fighting in 1994-1995. The area is strategically vital to the Serbs because it lies between the two halves of the Bosnian Serb Republic. Ultimate ownership of this area was not settled in the Dayton Peace Accord resulting in a continuing atmosphere of fear and distrust. To strengthen their hold on the area, the Serbs are moving refugees from Sarajevo into nearby Brcko. Their plan is to bring enough Serbs into this area to claim rightful ownership.<sup>3</sup> The Moslems are using the same "possession" tactic thereby greatly heightening tensions between the two groups.

The situation is the same in other parts of Bosnia as the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) oversees the refugee repatriation effort. Both Bosnian Serbs and Moslems are fearful of what the repatriation might bring. Each side does not want to lose control of an area they fought to gain during the war and they know that they can only control territory

by controlling people. Because of the atrocities committed during the war, both sides fear the retribution that might come with repatriation.<sup>4</sup>

The peacekeepers of Second Platoon, I Troop, 3/2 Armored Cavalry Regiment are part of Task Force Eagle- the US-led portion of the NATO SFOR in Bosnia. Task Force Eagle's mission includes deterring hostilities, stabilizing Bosnia-Herzegovina and assisting in the consolidation of the peace by contributing to a secure environment and fostering ongoing civil implementation plans<sup>5</sup> ...all within an atmosphere of fear, hatred and nationalism. Second Platoon's .50 caliber machine-guns and armored high-mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) are effective in many conventional military environments. However, they have very limited utility in an environment where the adversary is a perception of fear and instability within the population? How do peacekeepers attack these destabilizing attitudes and perceptions?

### ***Waging Peace...the Army's Dilemma***

Within the last decade the United States military has been directly involved in many other peace operations including missions in Somalia, Iraq, Rwanda, Haiti, and Macedonia. Those missions together with the indefinite extension of military support to operations in Bosnia demonstrate the significance that peace operations play in the US national security strategy.

Peacekeepers are called on to display restraint and impartiality yet must be prepared to react quickly to violent situations. Explicit rules of engagement often severely restrict the use of physical force by peacekeepers. In contrast, Army doctrine and weapon systems are predominantly oriented toward the use of force against known or suspected



enemies. This situation creates a dilemma for peacekeeping forces: how can they accomplish their mission when there is no definitive adversary, their use of force is severely restricted and their weapons and doctrine focus on the application of violence? This dilemma often leaves the U.S. military forces ill-equipped to operate in the complex environment of peace operations.

### ***New Arrows in the Quiver<sup>6</sup>***


Information operations can help solve this use-of-force dilemma by offering a non-violent alternative. The United States has recently focused its attention on information operations in light of the dramatic advances in information technology and their impact on national security. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been studying the concept of information warfare and information operations since the late 1970s. The concept is based on a set of integrating activities that counter an adversary's information systems while protecting our own. The joint staff and each of the military services have each developed their own doctrine, terminology and definitions in the field of IO. These efforts have been disjointed and decentralized resulting in confusion and a lack of synergy in the development of U.S. IO capabilities.<sup>7</sup>

This situation changed for the better in 1996 when the Department of Defense published directive S-3600.1 (Information Operations) which set the standard for IO policy and defined a host of new terms and concepts.<sup>8</sup> This directive defines IO as "Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."<sup>9</sup> Since the publishing of the directive, the DOD agencies, the joint staff, and each of the services are in the process of rewriting

their publications on IO to comply with the language and concepts set forth in the directive.

### ***Doctrinal Perspectives on IO***

The joint staff is very close to publishing its first capstone publication on IO. Joint Pub. 3-13 (Information Operations) is in the coordinating draft stage and will probably be completed in fiscal year 1998. The joint publication follows the DOD directive closely and describes the military's role within the information operations hierarchy (see figure 1). It groups IO into two categories: offensive IO and defensive IO. Each category integrates



**Figure 1: Information Operations Hierarchy**

various combined arms activities with some applying to both offensive and defensive IO.<sup>10</sup>

The focus for IO in the current and emerging doctrine is clearly oriented toward conventional military operations, yet IO can be of tremendous utility in unconventional

environments such as peace operations. As previously stated, the use of deadly force in peace operations is typically constrained by rules of engagement. Given that constraint, IO provides peace operation forces with a combat multiplier that can be used to create favorable conditions for stability and deter potential conflict without the need to resort to violence or deadly force. Information operations can increase flexibility in peace operations and support US national security policies without the risk of escalation caused by the use of physical force. When physical force must be used in a peace operation, IO can offset the negative effects by positively shaping the perceptions of the actors within the information environment. The United States dominance in the field of information technology gives commanders many additional options besides the use of physical force when conducting peace operations.

This monograph focuses on how IO can assist commanders and staffs at the operational level of war in planning peace operations. It will answer the question, what role can information operations play in a peace operation and how can planners at the operational level integrate information operations into their overall plan? In answering this research question, this monograph analyzes the theoretical and doctrinal basis for using information operations in peacekeeping. Specifically, section two analyzes the domains of conflict as they apply to peace operations and provides examples of how IO has been used to support military operations within those domains. Following the analysis of the domains of conflict, section three looks at how the elements of operational design apply to peace operations. This analysis will help illustrate the linkage between the end state, center of gravity, decisive points, objectives, and lines of operation in a peace

operation. The last section of the monograph examines how IO is finally integrated into the overall peace operation plan and covers the following topics:

- IO staff organizations for peace operations
- Defining the IO functions in a peace operation and relating them to the core military functions
- Integration of IO into the operational-level plan

Besides serving as a practical guide for specific uses of IO in a peace operation, this monograph will conclude with recommendations on other areas for research, how to modify joint and Army peace operation doctrine to include IO and considerations for future organizational and training changes that support information operations.

## **2. Estimating the Situation: The Domains of Conflict**

*Peace is best secured by those who use their strength justly and who show they have no intention of submitting to injustice.*

*Address of the Corinthians to the Athenians*<sup>11</sup>

Military theory is often studied from the standpoint of three domains of conflict: the physical, moral, and cybernetic. The physical domain includes terrain, weapon systems, technology, enemy and friendly troops, physical structures, etc. The moral domain of conflict encompasses the psychological and sociological aspects of conflict. Finally, the cybernetic domain of conflict deals with control processes in mechanical, electronic, and biological systems.<sup>12</sup> As they relate to conventional military operations, the domains of conflict explain "how the actions of military forces—both enemy and friendly—resolve conflict."<sup>13</sup>

Conventional military operations focus primarily on the physical domain of conflict. The primary objective of conventional military operations is typically the destruction of enemy weapon systems, personnel and structures and/or the control of terrain. This is not to say the other domains don't enter into the picture, just that the physical domain usually predominates. In contrast, a key characteristic of traditional peace operations is the severe restraints often placed on the use of physical force. This creates a condition where the physical domain often plays a lesser role than it does in a more conventional military operation. Therefore, military planners will fail if they focus primarily on the physical domain when planning a peace operation. They must take a broader, more holistic view of the conflict to be successful. The physical, moral and cybernetic domains provide this extended view by focusing on all aspects of the conflict.

This extended view will pay off for planners during the situation development, crisis assessment and course of action development phases of the crisis action planning process.

### ***The Physical Domain and Peace Operations***

The physical domain of conflict encompasses the “whole process of destruction.”<sup>14</sup> It includes the effects of weapons, munitions, terrain, weather and logistics in warfare.<sup>15</sup> With that conventional definition in mind, what is the physical domain of a peace operation? In addressing this question, FM 100-23 (Peace Operations) focuses primarily in two areas: the use of force and force protection.<sup>16</sup> Other key aspects of the physical domain in a peace operation include terrain, the opposing factions, the local populace and the physical infrastructure.

Violence is a natural characteristic of war. Clausewitz perfectly describes this characteristic of war saying, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”.<sup>17</sup> A peace operation, however, often requires extremely limited uses of force. One could think of peace operations as “coercion by other means.”<sup>18</sup> A good example of the how important it is to limit the use of force occurred in Bosnia in December 1996. Tensions were very high at that time due to upcoming elections and the desire for competing factions to gain control over the radio and television stations to further their cause. When a group of NATO peacekeepers blocked a mob from taking over a radio station, the scene became violent. The peacekeepers did not resort to using deadly force even though the mob threw rocks and seriously injured some of the peacekeepers.<sup>19</sup>

If the peacekeepers had shot several members of the mob in order to protect the radio station the short-term result might have been favorable. The crowd would have likely dispersed to avoid becoming the next target. However, the long-term result would

have been a possible disaster. The peacekeepers might have lost their credibility as an impartial peacekeeping force. Their mission of maintaining stability and security would have been enhanced in the short run only to be seriously compromised over the long term.

Information operations can act as a deterrent and in some cases, mitigate the need for physical force to accomplish mission objectives. In the example above, the physical presence of peacekeepers near the radio stations only aggravated the situation. Their efforts to retain the radio station ultimately failed as the violent mob eventually gained control over several radio and television stations. Since the use of physical force failed the NATO forces decided to switch tactics. Using electronic warfare, NATO peacekeepers blocked radio and television signals that were being used by faction leaders to agitate the local population and undermine the election process. The NATO peacekeepers were able to maintain stability and security without resorting to physical force.<sup>20</sup> Had they stated their intent to use electronic warfare earlier, it may have even deterred the mob violence in the first place.

Force protection is the another key component of the physical domain of a peace operation. It is a planned set of activities and policies designed to protect soldiers, civilians, facilities and equipment in all locations and situations.<sup>21</sup> Like using physical force, excessive force protection measures can have some short term benefits but detract from overall mission accomplishment in a peace operation. During Operation Joint Endeavor, Force Protection Working Groups (FPWGs) conducted threat assessments, made recommendations and helped develop force protection policies for US soldiers assigned to Task Force Eagle and V Corps (Forward). Task Force Eagle soldiers routinely wore full force protection gear consisting of weapon, kevlar helmet, and body

armor.<sup>22</sup> These force protection measures paid off with no deaths or serious injury due to hostile actions or accidents. Nevertheless, some of the other NATO contingents felt that the US force protection policies were excessive and detracted from the political objectives of Operation Joint Endeavor. They also believed that the U.S. force protection policies were a source of friction between the participating NATO contingents. Foreign officers accused US officers of being risk averse and not understanding the nature of peacekeeping.<sup>23</sup>

Information operations can provide an excellent means of assessing force protection and other policies in a peace operation. Civil affairs and public affairs teams can query the local population about their attitudes toward US force protection policies. A battalion commander in Task Force Eagle used this exact technique before and after key Implementation Force (IFOR) activities. His guidance to his PSYOP/CA teams was to go out and “get a feel” for the attitudes of the civilians regarding the actions of his soldiers.<sup>24</sup> This helped the commander avoid excessive policies and determine what force protection measures were most *appropriate* for his unit.

Information operations can also provide similar assessment capabilities internal to the military organization. For example, while commanding the UN military forces in Haiti, Major General Kinzer gave weekly Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) broadcasts. These radio broadcasts were directed at the US soldiers in Haiti and served as one of MG Kinzer’s command information tools. On the air, he explained the mission, uniform policies, and the importance of projecting military professionalism at all times.<sup>25</sup> Soldiers clearly understood the logic behind Major General Kinzer’s policies and as a result, morale and esprit within the organization improved.



Terrain represents another element of the physical domain in a peace operation. Protected Zones and Zones of separation (ZOS) are often used to separate belligerent factions. Military forces patrol these ZOSs and man checkpoints to monitor traffic through these areas. Sometimes various factions contest these areas as in the case mentioned earlier with Stari Rasadnik. Nevertheless, peace operation forces are often charged with establishing and maintaining security in these areas by physically separating and placing themselves between the contesting factions.

Again, information operations can help peace operation forces secure key terrain in their area of responsibility. A PSYOP and civil affairs effort can help explain the protected zones and ZOSs to the local population helping prevent accidental territorial violations. This same information effort can also explain the consequences for violating established boundaries. Public affairs teams can focus media attention on the military's quick reaction force capability. That demonstration of capability presented by the media might then act as a deterrent against territorial violations.

The local populace and the infrastructure are the final components of the physical domain in a peace operation. Peacekeepers use local roads, buildings, and other facilities as part of their normal operations. The presence of a peacekeeping force can cause friction with the local population as the two groups compete for usage of the local infrastructure. This friction could have a detrimental effect on mission accomplishment unless actions are taken to prevent it.

Information operations can mitigate the friction between civilians and peacekeepers for the use of local infrastructure. It can even improve the situation by making the infrastructure more efficient and safe for the local civilians. During Operation

JOINT ENDEAVOR, Tactical PSYOPs Teams (TPTs) conducted an information campaign aimed at educating local children on the dangers of playing near the lodgment areas and running into the streets. This effort became a very productive public relations tool and reduced the risk of local children getting hurt. The TPTs helped make the local infrastructure safer to the civilians and improved their attitudes toward the peacekeepers at the same time.<sup>26</sup>

### ***The Moral Domain and Peace Operations***

Clausewitz stated that war is composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity where men fight one another because of hostile feelings and hostile intentions.<sup>27</sup> Those emotions often continue unabated even after a peace operation begins. The physical violence stops or subsides but the *war of emotions* continues. This is the war the peace operation force fights and thus makes the moral domain of conflict the most critical in a peace operation.

The moral domain of conflict encompasses the human spirit and the human need for motivation.<sup>28</sup> Within the moral domain, a commander “seeks to defeat an enemy by shaping the enemy’s ideas, perceptions and beliefs in ways that create negative effects and lead to defeat.”<sup>29</sup> However, peace operations are not about defeating an enemy but are oriented on defeating perceptions and attitudes that lead to instability or conflict...defeating, or at least controlling, that war of emotions. In analyzing the moral domain of a peace operation, the planner considers the perceptions and attitudes of the local populace, the international community and the peacekeeping force itself.

The perceptions and attitudes of the local population is the focal point of the moral domain in a peace operation. Ideally, the local population views the peace operation as a

legitimate undertaking. Legitimacy grows out of the perception that people have toward the legality, morality, and correctness of a set of actions.<sup>30</sup> This legitimacy is critical to the success of the peace operation and will impact all of the other actions the military force takes. Every action that a peacekeeping unit takes should reinforce the perception of legitimacy among the local population.

A key IO function in the battle over perceptions and attitudes is military PSYOPS. The value of PSYOPS in shaping perceptions and enhancing legitimacy of the peacekeeping force was demonstrated during operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group focused on discrediting the Cedras regime and supporting the lawfully elected Aristide government. The PSYOPS effort capitalized on new technologies such as the Internet and electronic mail. This operation paid off when support for the discredited Cedras regime evaporated shortly after the arrival of the multinational peacekeeping force.<sup>31</sup>

The international community is the next target group within the moral domain of a peace operation. The international community in this context includes various governments (particularly those directly involved in the peace operation), the United Nations, various governmental organizations, non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs/PVOs) and the media. How well the international community accepts a peace operation and views its legitimacy is instrumental in its continued success and survival.

Information operations can help shape positive attitudes and perceptions in the international community toward a peace operation through the use of public affairs. Immediately after the U.S. Marine Corps successfully executed the rescue operation of

downed pilot Scott O'Grady, a Navy public affairs officer called CNN with the news. Admiral Leighton Smith, then commander of NATO forces in southern Europe was immediately ready to give a press statement concerning the operation. O'Grady was still aboard the rescue helicopter when the call was made to CNN. A NATO spokesman in Italy then sent releases to all the wire services, newspapers, and networks.<sup>32</sup> The efforts of the NATO public affairs officers ensured the rapid and thorough dissemination of the good news. The power of the mass media coverage of the rescue helped reduce negative perceptions within the international community about U.S. involvement in the Balkans.

Effective civil affairs operations can also help shape positive attitudes among the international community. Civil affairs activities in Haiti were primarily focused on facilitating humanitarian assistance. Civil affairs personnel worked with the over 400 NGOs and PVOs in Haiti to assist in transportation and security. A Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) conducted weekly meetings with NGOs and PVOs to help coordinate support for their operations.<sup>33</sup> These civil affairs activities helped shape very positive impressions of the multinational peacekeeping force within the international humanitarian assistance community.

The final dimension of the moral domain in a peace operation is the attitudes and perceptions of the peacekeeping force itself. Colonel Ardant du Picq certainly understood the importance these attitudes and perceptions when he stated:

*"The art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. But one thing does not change, the heart of man. In the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale".<sup>34</sup>*

The importance of unit morale is critical in peace operations also. Units with high morale will likely feel good about their mission and perform their duties better.

Information operations again play an important role in sustaining unit morale throughout the duration of the mission. U.S. peacekeepers in Haiti could make limited use of military telephone trunks to place calls home during the mission. Others used a reduced-rate telephone service provided by AT&T Direct to place calls to home. Some soldiers also used their military email accounts to keep in touch with loved ones. The U.S. contingent even made their video teleconferencing center available to soldiers for periodic virtual homecomings. As mentioned earlier, AFRTS was very active in Haiti providing information as well as entertainment to U.S. soldiers. AFRTS operated FM radio and television services twenty-four hours a day from a small building inside the Light Industrial Complex in Port Au Price. Chaplains stated that the AFRTS broadcasts helped relieve soldier stress and frustration.<sup>35</sup> Overall, the benefit to unit morale provided by electronic communications was significant and a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) study suggested that all U.S. peace operations employ similar techniques.<sup>36</sup>

### ***The Cybernetic Domain and Peace Operations***

The cybernetic domain of conflict deals with the realm of information and control. It includes the methods and means by which individuals and organizations make and promulgate decisions in order to direct action. Organization and infrastructure are part of the cybernetic domain since it is through these structures that control is exercised.<sup>37</sup> A commander seeks to disintegrate an enemy's methods and means of control so that the enemy can no longer articulate and control his forces within the cybernetic domain of the conventional battlefield.<sup>38</sup>

The commander of a peace operation, however, is not fighting enemy control mechanisms. As in the physical and moral domains of a peace operation, the commander

seeks to create favorable conditions for the attainment of his mission objectives. He conducts activities in the cybernetic domain that cause decision-makers to direct actions that are favorable to the mission. Three distinct aspects of the cybernetic domain of a peace operation stand out: internal decision-makers, external decision-makers and the information infrastructure.

Internal decision-makers are the formal and informal leaders directly involved with the peace operation. This group includes but is not limited to civilian and military leaders involved with the operation, local governmental officials, NGO/PVO leadership, and informal leaders within the local population. The commander must understand who these internal decision-makers are and what influence they have over the peace operation. The commander can then direct actions that will influence these decision-makers to exercise control and direct action in a way that supports the mission.

Task Force Eagle in Bosnia has used IO extensively to influence the attitudes and actions of the leadership in the Former Warring Factions (FWF). The public affairs teams and Task Force Eagle leadership has been particularly good at using the media as a “peace operation” multiplier. As the commander of one brigade combat team put it-

*The factions get real nervous around the press, they get real nervous around cameras. ...It definitely makes things happen. I can say I have close air support – that’s obvious. I have attack helicopters – that’s obvious. I have “x” number of Mark 19s (automatic grenade launchers), I outnumber you. But I’ve also got Time, Newsweek and CNN – and that has a big impact on their behavior.<sup>39</sup>*

Task Force Eagle also used command and control warfare (C2W) to facilitate the FWF’s ability to command and control their forces so they could comply with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). One task force commander threatened to release to the media reconnaissance videos of ZOS violations committed by faction

military forces in order to compel the faction leadership into complying more closely with the GFAP.<sup>40</sup>

External decision-makers can also have an enormous impact on the overall outcome of a peace operation. National leaders make decisions to provide forces for peace operations, determine the objectives of the peace operation, continue providing resources to peace operations, determine the rules of engagement, and influence support from other external leaders. This group includes but is not limited to politicians, diplomats, religious leaders, business leaders and leadership in the media. They base their decisions on the information they receive about a peace operation. Therefore, information that can influence their attitudes and perceptions is extremely important.

The media can have a tremendous impact on external decision-makers. During the Gulf War, one White House official said, "If you had to choose between reading the cables [from U.S. embassies] in your box and tuning in on CNN three times a day, you'd tune in to CNN."<sup>41</sup> The problem with that phenomenon is that mass media, particularly television, can be impressionistic, selective, superficial and sensationalist, and very poor at conveying the complexity of any situation.<sup>42</sup> External leaders that make decisions based largely on media sound bites can have a negative impact on the overall success of the peace operation.

Combating poor decisions based on media reports is a command responsibility. Commanders should be cautious of reporters with "hidden agendas" but nevertheless try to develop good relationships with the press. They should task their public affairs personnel to promote balanced and accurate reporting of the operation. The military should not censor or mislead the press but try to cooperate and develop mutual trust and

respect.<sup>43</sup> The public affairs staff should analyze the peace operation for issues that reporters might pursue during the interview. This “media IPB” will help inform the commander as to the probability of the media taking statements out of context to inflame an issue and grab headlines.



**Figure 2: MG Kinzer with the media in Haiti<sup>44</sup>**

An example of the media creating a negative response from external decision-makers occurred in June 1995 during the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). *USA Today* interviewed Major General Kinzer, the military force commander, about the overall mission and how long the United States would provide troops for the operation. Kinzer was careful not to give statements regarding U.S. troop commitment policy since that was a matter for the Pentagon and the civilian leadership in Washington. Nevertheless, the reporter published statements out of context and the article gave the impression that the U.S. was prepared to keep forces in Haiti for an extended period of time.<sup>45</sup> Everyone in



Washington understood that Kinzer was taken out of context but the media coverage touched an emotional nerve due to the political sensitivity of the issue. General Kinzer was advised that it would be best to avoid the media for awhile and let everything settle down. It was a classic case of a reporter taking statements out of context to grab a headline. After that incident, General Kinzer quickly learned which reporters and media agencies he could trust. He maintained good relations with the media in Haiti but avoided policy issues and never let another reporter quote him out of context.<sup>46</sup>

The information environment of a peace operation includes the infrastructure and organization that decision-makers use to exercise control. Depending on the decision-maker, this environment could consist of a very sophisticated organization that uses satellite technology to exercise control over operations. On the other hand, it could be an ad-hoc or informal organization that passes information by word-of-mouth or courier. The commander and staff of a peace operation need to identify the decision-makers that could affect the mission as well as the information environment they use to promulgate their decisions.

The types of information environments that support decision-makers will determine whether the military employs a low-tech or high-tech IO solution to enhance the peace operation. In some cases, military forces will need to improvise in order to successfully conduct IO. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, US Army units found their primary communications intelligence (COMINT) collection asset, the TRQ-32, ineffective for monitoring communications traffic in that area. Their equipment was designed to monitor military frequencies but the primary means of wireless communications in Haiti was civilian portable radios. These radios operated on

frequencies that the TRQ-32 could not effectively monitor. To compensate for this inadequacy, the US Army COMINT units went for a low-tech solution. They purchased off-the-shelf Radio Shack scanners that allowed them to effectively monitor wireless communication in the area.<sup>47</sup>

The physical, moral and cybernetic domains of conflict provide a holistic approach to analyzing a military operation and help establish the groundwork for integrating IO into a peace operation. This analysis broadens our understanding of the operational environment and helps indicate where IO can serve as a force multiplier. Figure three gives a summary of the previous section. It graphically shows the domains as they apply to peace operations and some examples of how IO might assist in achieving mission objectives.

	<b>Physical Domain</b>	<b>Moral Domain</b>	<b>Cybernetic Domain</b>
<b>Peace Operation Considerations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of Force</li> <li>• Force Protection</li> <li>• Factions</li> <li>• Local Populace</li> <li>• Terrain</li> <li>• Infrastructure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attitudes/perceptions of the local populace</li> <li>• Attitudes/perceptions of the international community</li> <li>• Attitudes/perceptions of the peacekeeping force</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Internal decision-makers</li> <li>• External decision-makers</li> <li>• Information environment</li> </ul>
<b>Example IO Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EW as an alternative to physical force</li> <li>• Command info program to explain force protection policies</li> <li>• PSYOP to explain protected zones</li> <li>• PSYOP/CA to minimize military impact on local infrastructure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PSYOP to instill favorable attitudes in local population and discredit belligerents</li> <li>• PA/CA to improve attitudes of international community</li> <li>• Commo support to improve morale of military force</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PA teams use EW and media coverage to influence local decision-makers</li> <li>• C2W to facilitate compliance with peace agreements</li> <li>• PA to favorably influence external decision-makers</li> <li>• EW to control information environment</li> </ul>

**Figure 3: Domains of conflict and peace operations**

The purpose of this section was to show how the domains of conflict could help planners broaden their understanding of the environment of conflict in a peace operation. Looking beyond the physical domain gives planners a greater appreciation of the complexity of the peace operation environment and the impact that military operations will have on the situation. Within each domain, information operations can serve as a useful tool for reinforcing the positive effects of military activities as well as countering some of their negative effects.

### **3. Planning Peace Operations: The Elements of Operational Design**

*The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is inappropriate in peace operations.*<sup>48</sup>

*FM 100-23, Peace Operations*

Analyzing the domains of conflict as they apply to a peace operation is a preliminary step in determining exactly how IO can act as a force multiplier. However, in order to determine what specific IO activities a unit should conduct, planners must take their analysis a step further. The analysis of the elements of operational design in a peace operation is that next step. This analysis will provide the planner with a conceptual linkage of ends, ways and means that will show specifically how IO can enhance the peace operation. The elements of operational design that influence IO planning are operational vision and end state, center of gravity, decisive points and objectives, and lines of operation.

#### ***Operational Vision and End State***

Clausewitz tells us “that war is only a branch of political activity” and therefore, “policy will determine its character.”<sup>49</sup> Our warfighting doctrine clearly accepts that theoretical concept with Joint Pub. 3-0 stating “planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the objective, purpose of the operations, and commander’s intent (the commander’s vision of the end state to be achieved).”<sup>50</sup> The military objectives that achieve the political policy or “end state” will be defined in the form of guidance from the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).<sup>51</sup>

Political objectives and end state are critical in peace operations just as they are in war. However, they are sometimes more difficult to obtain due to the complexities of most peace operations. Planning for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY began with very vague objectives such as the restoration of democracy, the reduction of refugee flow to the US, and the enhancement of United Nations (UN)/Organization of American States (OAS)/US credibility. The military end state for the operation was finally worked out as a "secure and stable environment" for the transition to a UN peacekeeping mission. The events required to meet this end state were identified as the entry of a multinational peacekeeping force, the return of President Aristide and the establishment of his government, and the establishment of an Interim Public Security Force.<sup>52</sup>

Doctrinally, the US Army views *conflict resolution* as a sort of politically generic end state for peace operations.<sup>53</sup> This is more than a military end state since achieving it requires assistance from the other instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic and informational. Nevertheless, the political end state for a peace operation is important to the military force since they will often conduct activities that support the other instruments of power. The end state provides the unity of effort that is essential to a peace operation.

The specific military end state for a peace operation is usually found in mandates or diplomatic peace accords. The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) used UN Security Council resolutions 867, 940, and 975 as its charter for conducting operations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 specifically stated UNMIH's military objectives as:<sup>54</sup>

- To sustain the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations.
- Professionalize the Haitian armed forces (this condition later dropped) and create a professional separate police force (military force in a supporting role only).
- Assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities and, when requested by them, monitored by the United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS).

Commanders of peace operations must take the political and military objectives and end states defined in the promulgating documents and derive their operational vision. Doctrinally, operational vision is not a part of the elements of operational design yet it is vital for describing how the force will achieve success and reach its end state.

Commanders outline their vision for the operation in their intent statement. The intent statement is critical since it:

...provides a link between the mission and the concept of operations by stating the key tasks that along with the mission are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of operations no longer applies...<sup>55</sup>

The commander's intent therefore tells subordinates what success looks like and gives them the freedom to exercise initiative during the operation.

In a peace operation, the intent will not focus on key tasks with respect to the enemy and terrain as it does in a combat operation. The commander of the US Forces Haiti (USFORHAITI) took the UN Security Council Resolution and derived the following intent statement:

The purpose of this mission is to maintain a secure and stable environment which allows the government of Haiti to maintain functional governance, gradually transferring responsibility for the secure and stable environment to the government of Haiti. The end state is defined as the secure and stable environment that allows social and economic development, free

elections, and peaceful transition of responsibility to the government of Haiti.<sup>56</sup>

### ***Modifying the Great Metaphor***

The next element of military operational design is the center of gravity. Clausewitz created this metaphor to illustrate the dominant characteristics of each belligerent in a particular conflict<sup>57</sup>. The ideal military strategy involved identifying the adversary's center of gravity and then directing all of one's energy against it. Clausewitz cited three examples of centers of gravity: the enemy's army, their capital city or their primary ally.<sup>58</sup> The US military has taken Clausewitz's famous metaphor and modified it to include "those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."<sup>59</sup> Even though this definition expands slightly on Clausewitz's idea, it still focuses primarily on enemy or friendly military organizations.

This definition, however, limits the analytical utility of centers of gravity in peace operations since there is no definitive adversary and there are many other actors besides military forces involved. In conventional military operations, centers of gravity are more concrete but in peace operations, centers of gravity take on a more abstract and conceptual form. Instead of a specific characteristic, capability, or locality, we must look at attitudes and perceptions that could lead to instability. Peace operations take place in environments where stability and order are absent and various competing factions contend for power and influence. Peacekeepers can conduct military operations that ensure physical security but it is the attitudes and perceptions of the various actors and organizations in a peace operation that will most directly affect its outcome. The focal

point of the peace operation is to attack anything that contributes to attitudes and perceptions of instability in the area of operations.

Using perceptions and *attitudes of instability* as a generic center of gravity in a peace operation provides a logical link to the generic end state of *conflict resolution*. If our political end state is conflict resolution and settlement, the thing that most threatens that end state is perceptions and attitudes of instability. If left unchecked, these negative perceptions and attitudes can develop into violence. If the peace operation force can influence these attitudes and perceptions in a positive way, then there is a good chance they will avoid the outbreak of violence and achieve their political and military end states.

Shifting the center of gravity from a specific characteristic, capability or locality to destabilizing attitudes and perceptions recognizes the complexity of modern peace operations and the requirement for legitimacy and unity of effort.<sup>60</sup> This type of center of gravity is impartial since it does not apply to any particular individual or organization. Anyone, any group, or anything that creates attitudes and perceptions of instability must be attacked either physically or through other means such as information operations.

Conventional centers of gravity are focused on a particular enemy while the center of gravity in a peace operation is based on the entire environment of conflict. As a result, military forces will only play a partial role in achieving success in a peace operation. Other agencies like the US Department of State, United Nations, regional organizations, NGOs/PVOs, etc. play greater roles in achieving the objectives of the peace operation that they do in a typical "enemy-focused" conflict. A center of gravity that provides a common focus for all enhances inter-agency cooperation and unity of effort.



If we call the perceptions and attitudes of instability the center of gravity for our “adversary”, what is then the center of gravity for the peace operation forces? One study has suggested that legitimacy is typically the center of gravity for friendly forces in a peace operation.<sup>61</sup> Legitimacy provides the peace operation force with the “legal and moral high ground” necessary to accomplish their mission. Without legitimacy, the peace operation forces can face severe internal and external resistance to their efforts. All of the actions of the peace operation force should focus on protecting the friendly COG of legitimacy and attacking the “enemy” COG of perceptions and attitudes of instability.

### ***Decisive Points and Objectives***

Understanding the center of gravity in a peace operation narrows the focus of the peace operation but it is still too broad a concept for actually planning specific operations. As previously discussed, there are several domains within a conflict that can influence the environment of a peace operation. To focus solely on the center of gravity would prevent the military planner from considering all the subtle complexities of a peace operation that lie within those domains. What are needed at this point are entities that further focus the analytical effort. These entities are called decisive points.

The military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini considered decisive points an essential part of operational design. He saw them as providing direction for the application of mass in time and space. They also might decide the outcome of a particular battle depending on which side controlled the decisive point.<sup>62</sup> These points were either geographical strategic points (geographic locations that possessed military importance) or strategic points of maneuver (locations that were important because of the relative position of opposing forces).<sup>63</sup> The contemporary definition of decisive points is:

“physical elements or events in time that offer a commander a marked advantage and greatly influence the outcome of an action when correctly exploited. Some decisive points are geographical; for example, a port facility, a transportation network or node, or a base of operations. Other physical decisive points include elements of an enemy force such as a unit, command post, or major communications node. An important event, such as commitment of the enemy’s operational reserve, may also become a decisive point.”<sup>64</sup>


This definition expands the idea of decisive points beyond the geographic nature that Jomini envisioned. It includes critical *events* that may decide the outcome of a battle.

Decisive points are important because they provide the keys to attacking or defending a center of gravity.<sup>65</sup> As such, they provide a linkage to the center of gravity within the domains of conflict. By retaining or controlling decisive points, a military force obtains a decisive advantage over its opponent. In peace operations, however, military forces are not seeking a decisive advantage over a particular opponent. Nevertheless, the decisive points in a peace operation are still keys to attacking the center of gravity: attitudes and perceptions of instability. They are linked *conceptually* to the center of gravity and provide a means of focusing and directing military effort in time, space and purpose.

Decisive points encompass elements of all three domains of conflict. This is true even of strategic geographic decisive points. For example, both Union and Confederate forces in the American Civil War viewed Vicksburg as a decisive point. Physically, it offered significant military value to whoever controlled it. The side that controlled Vicksburg could restrict or deny movement along the Mississippi River. Vicksburg had cybernetic value as well. It was a key communications point where railroads and river

traffic converged. Finally, Vicksburg offered tremendous moral value. Its loss would strike a serious blow to the Confederacy and its Mississippi-born president, Jefferson Davis. If the Union took Vicksburg, it would morally reverse the military setbacks the North had suffered in the east.

Decisive points in peace operations also contain elements of each domain of conflict. Using the concept of domains of conflict helps planners take a broader view in analyzing a particular decisive point. Going back to our Bosnia-Herzegovina example, we could say that the control of the zone of separation (ZOS) is a decisive point for Task Force Eagle. If we analyze the ZOS we see that it definitely contains characteristics of each domain. Physically, it is key terrain designed to separate the warring factions. The factions themselves represent physical entities that must be separated and controlled. Morally, this area is a flash-point. If Task Force Eagle treats one faction differently than another during the separation process, it could easily lead to negative perceptions about the legitimacy of the peace operation. The safety of the local population around the zone of separation is a moral factor also. If civilians are injured as a result of actions around the ZOS, they will form negative attitudes toward the peace operation. These negative attitudes could spread throughout the international community if the media focuses on ZOS incidents. This leads to the cybernetic aspect of the ZOS. Faction leaders will make decisions based on how well Task Force Eagle controls the ZOS. If the factions violate the ZOS with impunity, their leaders will make decisions that produce actions unfavorable to the peace process. Figure four is an example of decisive points and their relation to the center of gravity in a peace operation.




**Figure 4: Center of Gravity and Decisive Points in a Peace Operation**

Some may look at the above diagram and say that it depicts the infamous “mission creep” that seems to come with every peace operation. That viewpoint is a result of a myopic view of peace operations. Analyzing the operation from the perspective of the three domains clearly shows that these decisive points fall within the purview of military operations. If the military force only concentrated on obvious military (i.e. predominantly physical) decisive points like establishing and controlling the ZOS, they would not effectively attack the center of gravity and ultimately fail in their mission. Expanding military involvement beyond the physical domain places the maximum pressure on the center of gravity and improves interagency cooperation and unity of effort.

Closely related to decisive points are objectives. Objectives are a further decomposition of decisive points and provide the military force with clearly defined,

decisive, and attainable aims.<sup>66</sup> Commander's direct military operations against objectives to attack or control decisive points. Objectives are nested within the elements of operational design in order to extend the common focus to military operations. It is at this level of operational design that units are actually tasked to perform specific military operations. In conventional terms, objectives are usually terrain-oriented but in a peace operation, they are often conceptual in nature. For this reason, they could be called logical objectives since they provide focus for military operations against the decisive point rather than simply delineating terrain. Figure five gives an example of some physical or terrain-oriented objectives and some conceptual objectives as they relate to their decisive point.



**Figure 5: Decisive Point-Objective Relationship**

Unlike the centers of gravity and decisive points, objectives *mostly* lie within a single domain of conflict. As the example in figure four depicts, internal and external support to the military factions falls largely within the moral domain, intelligence and

leadership fall within the cybernetic domain, and weapons and equipment occupies the physical domain. Each objective affects the decisive point in a different manner and each will require a unique application of military and non-military actions. Now that our analysis has decomposed the center of gravity to its lowest common denominator, the objective, we can begin to identify specific military activities aimed at achieving mission success. To do this, we need one last element of operational design: logical lines of operation.

### ***Logical Lines of Operation and Sequencing Events***

In a conventional military environment, lines of operation are geographic in nature. They connect a series of objectives to define the directional orientation of a force in time and space with respect to the enemy. They represent the aggregate of the avenues of approach and lines of communication along which a force or group of forces operates.<sup>67</sup>

Geographic lines of operation have little meaning in a peace operation since there is no enemy force against which to orient. In the case of peace operations, military planners must use “logical lines of operation” to orient the force toward objectives and decisive points. A logical line of operation “links multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose—cause and effect.”<sup>68</sup> This logical line of operation provides a conceptual link of purpose between the military force and its decisive points.


Planners sequence events along logical lines of operation to attack or control objectives and decisive points. These events are joined in purpose and have a complementary effect on each other. The logical line of operation integrates and coordinates all of the actions that affect the objective or decisive point. This creates a nesting effect that ensures that even the simplest tasks are analyzed according to their

relation to the decisive points and the center of gravity. Figure five shows the relationship between decisive points, logical lines of operation and the sequencing of events.

Information operations are just one type of event along a logical line of operation that could help a military force attack or control an objective. Using this structured framework of analysis prevents the misuse or poor allocation of information resources. Instead of being employed separately, used as an afterthought, or added through trial-and-error, information operations are integrated from the outset as part of a logical line of operation that focuses on a particular decisive point. As figure six shows, IO can be useful against physical objectives like weapons and equipment but even more useful against cybernetic objectives like faction leadership. In each case, the use of the elements of operational design provides integration of military activities and a common focus toward the decisive point. The resulting operational plan is more effective and makes more efficient use of available resources.

This section has covered the theoretical background behind peace operations and IO. The domains of conflict allow planners to analyze an environment of conflict from three perspectives: physical, moral and cybernetic. Military units are currently using information operations within each of these domains and thereby helping meet mission objectives. End states in peace operations focus on conflict resolution and specific objectives for peace operations are often spelled out in diplomatic agreements or mandates. The center of gravity in a peace operation is attitudes and perceptions of instability and has decisive points that encompass each domain of conflict. Decisive points are decomposed into multiple objectives that mostly orient on a particular domain of

conflict. Logical lines of operation lead to these objectives and contain sequences of events that are used to successfully attack, protect, or control the decisive point. Planners of future peace operations will be able to analyze their situation more thoroughly and better integrate key functions and capabilities like information operations by using the elements of operational design. Appendix B gives a historical example of how operational planners used the domains of conflict and the elements of operational design to develop the campaign plan for Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY.



**Figure 6: Logical Lines of Operation**



#### **4. Integrating IO into the Peace Operation Planning**

*To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.*

*Sun Tzu<sup>69</sup>*

Until now, this monograph has focused on developing a broad analytical framework that integrates the domains of conflict and applies the elements of operational design to peace operations. This analysis helps ensure that all military activities are linked by a common purpose and compliment one another. Having arrived at this point in our analysis, we are now ready to begin defining IO requirements and integrating them into the overall campaign plan for a peace operation. This section focuses specifically on IO staff organization and how IO functions can support a peace operation.

##### **Staff Organization and Planning Augmentation**

One of the biggest roadblocks to integrating IO in military operations is the overall lack of staff expertise in that area. To help overcome this deficiency, the Army created the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA). Established on 8 May 1995 as part of the Army's Modernization Plan, LIWA provides operational and tactical commanders with an immediate IO staff capability.<sup>70</sup> The LIWA provides Field Support Teams (FSTs) to commanders to help them integrate the offensive and defensive IO functions into their overall operational plan.<sup>71</sup> The FSTs also provide quick-reaction area studies to Land Component Commanders (LCC) during crisis action planning. When deployed, the FSTs become an integral part of the operational commander's staff and assist in the synchronization and execution of IO activities.<sup>72</sup>

The LIWA concept received its baptism-by-fire during the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division's (1<sup>st</sup> ID) deployment as part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. In

Bosnia, the LIWA FST contributed to the mission by preparing the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division's IO annex and developing information themes for the commanding general's approval.<sup>73</sup> The LIWA FST successfully filled the IO void in the 1<sup>st</sup> ID staff and increased the overall effectiveness of the division. Based on 1<sup>st</sup> ID's experience in Bosnia it seems clear that operational commanders should submit requests for LIWA support as soon as they begin their mission planning for peace operations.

However, the LIWA support should not be used as a panacea for integrating IO expertise into the staff. The increased emphasis on information operations has prompted the Army to analyze the organic staff requirements for planning and executing IO at the operational and tactical level. Joint and Army IO and staff operations doctrine does not specify a "preferred" IO staff organization. However, FM 100-6, Information Operations does describe three primary techniques for IO staff organization: integrate IO into the existing staff organization, create a dedicated IO battle staff, or create a process-oriented or ad hoc planning and coordinating IO staff cell.<sup>74</sup>

The first technique, integrating responsibilities across the existing battle staff, requires designating one or two individuals out of various staff elements (plans, operations, fires, logistics, PSYOP, CA, etc.) to plan and synchronize IO functions. The J3/G3 has overall staff responsibility for integrating IO into the unit's plans and loosely coordinates the efforts of the various staff elements.<sup>75</sup> The advantage to this technique is that it does not require substantial changes to the staff organization or procedures within the unit. The designated staff elements simply receive an additional requirement in addition to their normal duties. The disadvantage of this technique is that a large IO effort that can be expected in a peace operation could quickly overwhelm the staff. This

technique also assumes the staff elements have the requisite expertise and experience for integrating and synchronizing IO. Despite these disadvantages, this technique may be suitable for smaller organizations such as separate brigades and task forces conducting short-duration missions.

The most formal approach to IO integration is to create a dedicated IO battle staff. The dedicated IO battle staff is composed of full-time members from various IO functional areas such as PSYOPs, CA, PA, EW, signal, and battlefield deception.<sup>76</sup> The IO battle staff's activities are coordinated by the G/J-3 with input from the G/J2 and signal officer. The electronic warfare coordination center and the fire support coordination cell both augment the IO battle staff as needed.<sup>77</sup> Joint doctrine expands the IO battle staff to include representatives from various subordinate functional components such as the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC).<sup>78</sup>

This organization has the obvious advantage of ensuring the staff devotes a full-time effort to IO planning and coordination. The permanent members of the IO staff will understand and learn from each other thereby increasing the overall effectiveness of the IO effort. The rest of the staff benefits from having access to an organic element with a great amount of expertise and experience in the field of IO. For these reasons, the dedicated IO battle staff might be preferred in situations where the commanding general feels that IO is so critical to the operation that it warrants the creation of a separate staff element.

Conversely, a dedicated IO battle staff has some important disadvantages as well. The dedicated IO battle staff can be classified as a functional staff organization. It concentrates functional skills (in this case, IO skills) into a single staff element. The

positive group dynamic advantages described above could be offset by the tendency for functional groups to isolate themselves from the rest of the organization. The members of the functional group feel most comfortable with other specialists in their field and might spend little time interacting with other functional elements.<sup>79</sup>

Army staffs are largely composed of subordinate functional staff elements: personnel, operations, logistics, signal, intelligence, etc. Units are constantly fighting the isolating effect that functional staff elements create. Combat Training Center (CTC) trends clearly indicate that staff integration is a problem across the Army.<sup>80</sup> Functional staff elements tend to become isolated from each other as the pace of operations increases. Adding another functional staff element like a full-time IO battle staff might make the situation even worse.

The answer to many of the problems associated with functional staff elements is the process-oriented organization. This type of structure is currently the most common technique for IO staff organization and is similar in organization and function to the typical Army targeting cell. Members from the various IO disciplines meet periodically to plan and coordinate IO activities within the organization. A designated representative of the J-3/G-3 provides formal control over the IO planning process and actively coordinates the efforts of the participating staff members.<sup>81</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division used this type of staff organization while conducting peace operations in Bosnia. Their IO cell placed the LIWA element at the center of team coordinating the efforts of representatives from across the division staff. The 1<sup>st</sup> ID placed the division chief of staff overall in charge of the IO planning cell because their efforts spanned several different staff functions.<sup>82</sup> Based on guidance from the commander, the

IO planning and coordinating cell developed information themes and synchronized IO activities with the unit's overall plan.<sup>83</sup>

Management science classifies the process-oriented team as a matrix type organization. It exploits the capabilities of various IO staff specialists such as CA, PSYOP, fire support, etc. without creating another permanent staff organization. One advantage of this type of organization is that the line authority for the process is clearly designated providing a single focal point for guidance and decisions (the chief of staff and the LIWA in 1<sup>st</sup> ID's example). Specialists are grouped by function (PSYOP, CA, PA, EW, etc.) which encourages the sharing of experience and knowledge within the group.<sup>84</sup> Finally, this organization adds command emphasis (at least in the case of 1<sup>st</sup> ID) by putting the rank and expertise of the chief of staff in a central control position.

The process-oriented IO cell has a couple of disadvantages as well. The ad hoc nature of this organization could create some group dynamics problems due to the unfamiliarity between the group members. This phenomenon is exacerbated when an external entity such as the LIWA is placed in a key position within the organization. The group members will eventually overcome this problem as they gain experience working together but short-term effectiveness is still likely to suffer. The ad hoc nature of the process-oriented IO cell could also have an adverse effect on the long-term continuity of IO planning within the unit. Integration of IO into existing operations plans (OPLANs) is difficult with an ad hoc organization, as is the development of unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) for information operations.

An ideal IO staff organization would have the strengths of both a process-oriented IO cell and a dedicated IO battle staff without inheriting any of their weaknesses. One

way to offset the disadvantages of an ad hoc process-oriented IO cell without incurring the overhead of a dedicated IO battle staff is to create a small, dedicated coordinating element that serves as the nucleus of a process-oriented IO cell. This element would consist of three or four officers/senior non-commission officers with training and experience in planning and coordinating military information operations. This full-time element would fall under the J3/G3 and be led by a senior officer with broad experience and educational background in information operations. Other members of the staff would participate in IO planning and coordination just as they did under in the process-oriented IO cell. The difference would be that an organic coordinating element would guide and facilitate their efforts instead of an external group like a LIWA FST.

This is essentially the same concept being used to integrate special operations into US Army Corps staffs. The Corps Special Operations Coordination elements (SOCOORDs) are charged with advising and integrating Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities by planning and coordinating with special operations units.<sup>85</sup> As a permanent part of the corps staff, the SOCOORD provides day-to-day advice on Special Operations Forces (SOF) integration and assists in developing SOF missions as part of standard Operations Plans (OPLANS). The SOCOORDs also assist in integrating external organizations like Special Forces and Rangers for corps exercises and operations. Since its inception in 1994, the SOCOORD concept has been very successful in integrating SOF as a combat multiplier for corps operations.

There are several advantages to using this hybrid IO coordinating element concept. First, the IO coordination element would be well known to the rest of the battle staff and would be present on a day-to-day basis for OPLAN maintenance and information

operations SOP development. They could also conduct IO training for the rest of the battle staff thus improving the overall effectiveness of the IO cell. Like the SOCOORD, the IO coordination element could facilitate the integration of non-organic units such as PSYOPs and Civil Affairs into the corps or division. Finally, an organic IO coordination element would be present for smaller exercises and deployments that do not warrant support by LIWA FSTs.

### ***Integrating IO Functions***

After the commander has decided on the type of staff organization the unit will use for planning and coordinating IO activities, the IO staff must get down to the business of actually integrating IO functions into the overall operational plan. As mentioned earlier in this monograph (see figure 1), joint doctrine breaks information operations down into two components: offensive IO and defensive IO. Within those two groups lie the various IO elements such as information assurance, PSYOP, EW, etc. Unfortunately, current Army and Joint IO doctrine leaves planners with little guidance on exactly how to integrate these IO elements into a peace operation.

The objective of IO according to current doctrine is to achieve information dominance: "a relative advantage between the friendly commander's decision process and that of the adversary."<sup>86</sup> Joint and Army doctrine also devote considerable detail to the subject of C2 attack and C2 protect activities. Again, these concepts are inappropriate for peace operations because they orient IO towards a specific adversary and focus on conventional military operations. Planners of a peace operation require a broader understanding of the purpose of IO and how it fits into their overall operational design.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense prepared a research paper that analyzes the purpose of IO in peace operations. The study was based on an analysis of US military operations in Somalia as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). In this study, the authors conclude that information warfare (their term for military information operations) can be divided into three functional areas: perception management, information degradation or denial, and information exploitation.<sup>87</sup> This description is useful because it explains *how* IO supports a peace operation instead of just explaining *what* different IO tools are available for employment. This knowledge of how IO supports a peace operation greatly facilitates the integration of IO into the overall operational design.

Perception Management as it applies to IO goes beyond psychological operations and encompasses a formal effort to influence the perceptions and will of the various internal and external actors relevant to the peace operation.<sup>88</sup> Besides PSYOPs, it can involve civil affairs, public affairs, deception, and electronic warfare and even includes activities conducted by more conventional units such as infantry and engineers. For instance, engineer units in Haiti helped rebuild key bridges that were destroyed by hurricanes. The projects brought jobs to the region and influenced the perceptions of the local populace in a very favorable way.<sup>89</sup>

Perception management includes countering agitation and propaganda aimed at undermining the peace operation and conducting public information operations to reinforce the goals and objectives of the mission.<sup>90</sup> Countering agitation and propaganda often requires a mixture of low-tech and high-tech solutions. A low-tech solution would be to hand out flyers and post bulletins that denounce the actions of agitators. A high-tech



solution would be to show the news media reconnaissance imagery of peace accord violations. Both techniques serve to discredit and de-legitimize agitators and belligerents.

Public information activities must also include low and high-tech solutions. An example of a high-tech public information activity would be Task Force Eagle's *Talon Online* Web site. Designed to enhance external support for peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, *Talon Online* provides public information on the Task Force Eagle mission, the composition of the force, and activities they have done as part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). It shows pictures of Task Force Eagle soldiers helping local civilians and providing security for the area.<sup>91</sup> As a perception management tool, *Talon Online* focuses on creating a positive image of Task Force Eagle's operations in Bosnia.

The previously mentioned bridge building effort in Haiti is an example of a low-tech public information activity. No electronic messages were sent out, no web site was launched, yet the project created a very favorable perception of the peace operation in Haiti. The Haitians saw the bridge as a sign that their life would improve under the new government and that the peacekeepers were genuinely interested in helping them.

The lesson here for peace operation planners is that they must ensure that every objective within the overall plan includes a mixture of several IO activities directed at perception management. They must determine their target audience, the information theme, and how they will deliver their message. Using multiple methods of communication, both high-tech and low-tech, will help ensure the intended audience properly receives the message.

Information degradation and denial combines the elements of electronic warfare, deception, operations security (OPSEC), and physical destruction of communication

nodes. Like perception management, information degradation and denial can be high-tech or low-tech.<sup>92</sup> For example, if a belligerent faction is broadcasting messages that cause turmoil and unrest, peace operations forces can respond by using high-tech information degradation techniques like electronic signal jamming. The same peace operations forces can use low-tech solutions to degrade and deny information to potential adversaries. Simple techniques like using random times and routes for presence patrols combined with other OPSEC measures effectively deny potential adversaries information on the time or location of the force's activities.

Unfortunately, conducting information degradation and denial activities in a peace operation is often easier said than done. Belligerents can thwart electronic information collection efforts by using low-tech communication methods such as written messages and runners. This could effectively negate any technological advantage enjoyed by the peace operation force. These types of low-tech information degradation and denial methods were used frequently by Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. Using word-of-mouth communications and low-tech radio broadcasts, Aideed effectively countered UN electronic warfare capabilities. The Somalis also developed innovative methods for integrating civilians into their information denial and degradation scheme. Using civilian crowds for cover, the Somali clans were able to escape detection by US aerial reconnaissance and stage attacks against peacekeeping forces.<sup>93</sup> To counter these efforts, intelligence analysts must thoroughly analyze the cybernetic domain and determine who the decision-makers are and the information environment they use to exercise control. This will help the IO planners determine the best means of countering adversary information degradation and denial activities.

The last IO functional area in peace operations is information exploitation.

Information exploitation entails collecting, processing, and using information in a way that benefits the peace operation. The earlier example of reconnaissance imagery being used to influence faction leaders in Bosnia is a form of information exploitation. The SFOR were able to quickly gather very accurate information on illegal faction activities and then exploit that information by threatening to give it to the international media. Fearing international condemnation, the faction leaders quickly modified their behavior.

Information exploitation is very much like a targeting quick-fire procedure. Certain targets are identified as high-payoff, yet perishable. Military forces develop rapid procedures for collecting, processing, and deciding on the attack of these targets. Instead of firing ordinance at the target, the information itself becomes the weapon. This type of action requires a well-integrated staff that understands the value of rapidly exploiting information. The entire staff needs to understand what types of information can be exploited and the unit needs to have techniques for quickly transferring that information to the IO cell/battle staff for exploitation. To assist this effort, planners will need to identify possible opportunities for information exploitation associated with all of the operational decisive points.

Military planners will have completed their integration of IO into the peace operation plan when they have matched each of these IO functions to the core functions. The core functions are those basic and primary functions that all military organizations perform in the accomplishment of their mission. The core functions "provide the commander with a conceptual and practical way of looking at the capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces."<sup>94</sup> Even though peace operations don't have a particular

*enemy*, the core functions apply to peace operations since they are based on *capabilities* rather than a particular system, doctrine, or organization. The IO functions of perception management, information degradation and denial, and information exploitation compliment and are *complimented* by the core functions. Appendix “C” provides an example of an integration matrix that demonstrates the interrelationship between the core functions and the IO functions in a peace operation.

### ***Changes on the Peacefield***

This monograph has laid out an analytical framework for integrating IO into peace operations based on the domains of conflict and the elements of operational design. It has also described different IO staff organizations and the associated advantages and disadvantages of each. Finally, this monograph analyzed IO functions as they specifically apply to peace operations. The intent was to provide a structured way of analyzing peace operations and integrating information operations to support the overall plan.

The US military is beginning to take a keen interest in information operations but has missed the mark on its applicability to peace operations. Information operations are critical in these types of conflict because of the severe restrictions placed on the use of physical force. Our doctrine needs to place greater emphasis on the use of IO in peace operations as an alternative and/or compliment to physical force. Our doctrine also needs to formalize techniques for analyzing the environment of a peace operation using the domains of conflict and the elements of operational design.

Given that IO will command greater attention in our military doctrine, we should focus more effort on developing efficient staff organizations that facilitate effective IO. The combat training centers should analyze the different techniques for organizing the

staff for IO planning and coordination and publish their observations on the pros and cons of the various techniques. Once this subject has been debated and tested, joint and Army doctrine should be updated to describe IO staff organization and duties in detail.

Our professional institutions should incorporate greater amounts of training in general IO concepts and doctrine. This would provide a base level of knowledge in IO across the military. Since IO is a discipline that integrates several other specialties, the military should develop special training programs in this unique field for officers and non-commissioned officers. These "school-trained" IO specialists could then form the leadership of the new IO staff elements. Education will be the key to integrating IO into our military doctrine and our organizations.

This monograph analyzed methods for integrating IO into peace operation *planning*. Additional research should be conducted on *executing* IO in a peace operation. Much has been learned in the field about measuring the success of ongoing IO activities and adapting the IO effort to changes in the environment. Research on this subject could capture these lessons and observations for later inclusion in our military doctrine. Planning and integrating IO into peace operations is an important subject but the best IO support plan is useless, or even harmful, if poorly executed.

The U.S. military will undoubtedly continue to participate in peace operations to support humanitarian efforts and protect vital national interests. Yet this creates a functional paradox: forces that are trained in the application of physical violence must maintain stability and security in an environment where the use of force is severely restricted and often counterproductive. This paradoxical dilemma creates the requirement for developing new and innovative ways of achieving military objectives in peace

operations. Information operations provide one solution to this problem. By effectively integrating information operations into the overall operational design, commanders can take these new arrows out of the quiver and dominate the peacefield.

## Appendix A: Glossary

*Note: Definitions in this glossary taken from US Army or Joint manuals are direct quotes or nearly direct quotes. The normal formatting with quotation marks and/or italics has been omitted for legibility.*

**Center of gravity (COG).** Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.<sup>95</sup> Clausewitz intended this metaphor to apply primarily to the physical domain of conflict.<sup>96</sup> This monograph suggests a COG that encompasses the physical, moral, and cybernetic domains of conflict. The COG for peace operations generally is perceptions and attitudes of instability. These perceptions and attitudes begin in the cybernetic domain as leaders attempt to build resistance to, or support for the peace process. They then transition to the moral domain where they become feelings of animosity or friendliness among the populace and can finally become manifested in the physical domain as either violence or peaceful existence.

**Civil Affairs (CA).** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile are of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives.<sup>97</sup>

**Command and Control Warfare (C2W).** The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions.<sup>98</sup>

**Communications Intelligence (COMINT).** Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than intended recipients.<sup>99</sup>

**Core military functions.** The primary and essential functions that military units, both friendly and enemy, perform in conflict. They provide a commander with a conceptual and practical way of looking at the capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces. They also help him organize his force and prioritize its actions. Core functions integrate system, branch, service and interagency capabilities in complimentary and reinforcing ways to create a synergy.<sup>100</sup> Listed below are the six core military functions:

- a. **Sense:** to perceive or detect: a discerning awareness or appreciation that comes from effective application of intellect as a basis for action or response.
- b. **Strike:** to close with the enemy or, through distributed fires or information dominance, apply lethal and/or non-lethal effects to achieve objectives.
- c. **Shield:** to deny opponents the ability to threaten the force or interfere with its action and preserve one's own freedom of action and initiative.
- d. **Control:** to create a response; pressures exerted by physical, moral, or cybernetic means to exercise directing or restraining influence over an entity—friendly, enemy, or neutral.

- e. Sustain: to provide and preserve resources; human, material, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successfully completed.
- f. Move: to position and reposition forces.

**Cybernetic domain of conflict.** The cybernetic domain of conflict encompasses the realm of information and control. The modern science of control is called cybernetics, which means to “steer” or to “guide.” The ability of commanders to control and direct military action, convey vision, and maintain battlefield awareness lies in the cybernetic domain.<sup>101</sup>

**Dayton Peace Accords/General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).** The Dayton Proximity Talks culminated in December 1995 with the initialing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was initialed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Representatives of the Contact Group nations -- the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia and the European Union Special Negotiator, witnessed the Agreement. This agreement recognizes the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina and calls for a general end to violence in that region. The agreement contains eleven annexes that cover topics such as military aspects, regional stability, elections, arbitration, etc.<sup>102</sup>

**Decisive Point.** A point, if retained, that provides a commander with a marked advantage over his opponent. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature but could include other physical elements such as enemy formations, command posts, and communications nodes.<sup>103</sup> Like centers of gravity, current military doctrine views decisive points as being primarily within the physical domain of conflict. This monograph (and the revised final draft of FM 100-5: Operations) views decisive points in a more conceptual way that span all three domains of conflict. Decisive points are subsets of, and keys to attacking the center of gravity.

**Electronic Warfare (EW).** The use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and to ensure friendly use thereof.<sup>104</sup>

**End state.** A set of conditions that, when achieved, attain the aims set for the campaign or operation.<sup>105</sup>

**Former Warring Factions (FWF).** A term used to describe the different religious/cultural factions within Bosnia-Herzegovina that were at war before the signing of General Framework Agreement for Peace. These groups consist primarily of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats.

**Information Assurance.** Information assurance is defined as IO that protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,



and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.<sup>106</sup>

**Information Operations (IO).** Information operations are continuous military operations within the military information environment that enables, enhances, and protects the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve advantage across the full range of military operations.<sup>107</sup>

**J3/G3.** The deputy chief of staff for operations and training in a joint organization (J3) or an Army organization at division level or above (G3).

**Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA)/Field Support Team (FST).** LIWA is a subordinate organization of the United States Army Information Support Command (USINSCOM). LIWA's purpose is provide technical expertise that is not resident in the organization's staff. LIWA dispatches tailored support elements calls Field Support Teams (FSTs) to the land component commander of a joint operation to provide assistance in planning and coordinating information operations.<sup>108</sup>

**Lines of operation.** Lines of operation link an objective or a series of objectives to focus military activity toward the end state. In the geographic sense, lines of operation connect a series of objectives to define the directional orientation of a force in time and space with respect to the enemy. A line of operation expresses the aggregate of the avenues of approach and lines of communication along which a force or group of forces operates. Although most useful in a spatial context, the logical extension of the concept of lines of operation into complex stability and support actions may aid the commander in developing his intent.<sup>109</sup> This monograph takes this logical extension of the concept of lines of operation and applies it to peace operations. Like a physical line of operation, a logical line of operation focuses the military force on a particular decisive point. The logical line of operation however is not tied to physical entities like geographic avenues of approach. Logical lines of operation link the attainment of military objectives for the purpose of attacking or controlling decisive points.

**Military Deception.** Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. The goal is to make the enemy more vulnerable to the effects of weapons, maneuver, and operations of friendly forces.<sup>110</sup>

**Moral domain of conflict.** The moral domain encompasses the human spirit and the human need for motivation of physical action in the face of mortal danger--an expression of human will. The explanation for the intangible human qualities that make men fight, the subjective qualities of human nature--perception, conviction, morale, courage, fear, dedication, perseverance, and despair--lies in the moral domain. These factors affect a force's willingness and determination to take action and generate or apply meaningful physical effects. National and institutional values provide the building blocks that develop

the proper moral force. Operations should reflect and are often limited by those values the force shares with the population upon whose political support their success depends.<sup>111</sup>

**National Command Authorities (NCA).** The NCA consists of the president and the secretary of defense. The NCA exercises authority over the armed forces through combatant commanders and through the secretaries of the military departments and the Chiefs of those services, for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands.<sup>112</sup>

**NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR):** Following the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the UN, on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. The NATO-led multinational force called the Implementation Force - or "IFOR" - started Operation Joint Endeavor on 16 December. IFOR's role was to help the Parties to implement a peace accord to which they have freely agreed, in an even-handed way. IFOR did not come to Bosnia to fight a war or to impose a settlement on any of the Parties. The implementation of the Peace Agreement is the responsibility of the Parties themselves. In accordance with the Peace Agreement IFOR undertook the following primary military tasks:<sup>113</sup>

- ensuring continued compliance with the cease-fire;
- ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to their respective territories, and ensuring the separation of forces;
- ensuring the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilization of remaining forces;
- creating conditions for the safe, orderly and speedy withdrawal of UN forces that have not transferred to the NATO-led IFOR;
- controlling the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On 20 December 1996, IFOR successfully completed its mission. Hostilities had ceased and the factions' military forces had been separated and moved into cantonments. However, it was also clear that much remained to be done on the civilian side and that the environment would be too unstable and insecure to continue civilian implementation without an international military presence. Based on planning by the NATO Military Authorities and after a two-year Civilian Consolidation Plan was established in Paris and elaborated in London under the auspices of the Peace Implementation Council, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence was needed to provide the stability necessary for the consolidation of peace. They agreed that NATO should organize a Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was subsequently activated on 20 December 1996. SFOR's mission is to deter renewed hostilities and to stabilize the peace. While SFOR is only half the size of IFOR, it retains the same unity of command, robust rules of engagement, enforcement authority and consent by the Parties that made IFOR a success. SFOR, like its predecessor, is a joint operation, led by NATO, but with wide participation of non-NATO countries.

**Non-governmental organization (NGO)/private voluntary organization (PVO).** NGOs are transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. NGOs may be professional

associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities.<sup>114</sup> PVOs are private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities.<sup>115</sup>

**Objectives.** The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable aims which every military operation should be directed towards.<sup>116</sup>

**Operations Security (OPSEC).** Operations security is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.<sup>117</sup>

**Physical domain of conflict.** In the physical domain of conflict, forces use physical means to take action. Physical actions may, in turn, create certain effects in the physical, moral, or cybernetic domains. In the physical domain, we find the physical capabilities, the tangible elements of war and military operations--soldiers, their equipment, weapons, and technological applications--and their physical effects. The physical aspects of the environment--geography, terrain, weather, and demography--set the conditions for taking action to produce desired effects.<sup>118</sup>

**Psychological Operations (PSYOP).** Psychological operations are the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOPs is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.<sup>119</sup>

**Public Affairs (PA).** Public affairs is those public information and community relations activities directed toward the general public by the various elements of the Department of the Defense.<sup>120</sup>

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.<sup>121</sup>

**Targeting.** The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting involves an analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities. The purpose of targeting is to enhance the friendly course of action by identifying and nominating specific enemy vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's targeting objectives of delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying critical enemy forces or resources.<sup>122</sup>

**Task Force (TF).** A temporary grouping of units under one commander formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. A task force can also be a semi-permanent organization of units under one commander formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task.<sup>123</sup> Task Force Eagle in Bosnia is an example of the semi-permanent type of task force.

**Zone of Separation (ZOS):** That space controlled by a third-party, neutral force that enforces the parameters specified by international agreement, cease-fire agreement, or United Nations mandate.<sup>124</sup> The ZOS serves as a barrier between two belligerent forces. Typically, it is controlled using checkpoints to restrict access and reconnaissance and surveillance to identify ZOS violations.

## Appendix B: Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY Campaign Plan

Analysis of the domains of conflict and the elements of operational design is more than an intellectual exercise. It can provide genuine utility to the operational planner as a unit moves toward the execution phase of a peace operation. This analytical framework keeps information operations, and other military activities integrated into the overall campaign plan instead of just being an afterthought. The US Atlantic Command (USACOM) used a form of this analytical framework to plan Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY. Figure seven shows the briefing chart the USACOM planners used to describe their campaign plan for the peace operation in Haiti.




Figure 7: Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY Campaign Plan<sup>125</sup>

As the briefing chart shows, the planners correctly identified perceptions of instability as the center of gravity in Haiti. They then identified various decisive points that were linked to that center of gravity. They further decomposed some of the decisive points into subordinate objectives. These objectives focused on different domains of conflict and provided a broad analytical focus on each decisive point. Finally, the USACOM planners developed logical lines of operation that contained various tasks that would be used to attack, control, or protect each subordinate objective.

## Appendix C: Information Operations Integration Matrix

Figure eight shows an example IO integration matrix that links military activities to a given decisive point and associated objectives. This matrix is not meant to synchronize specific activities but to integrate them into the operational design and create a synergy with the core functions. The IO integration matrix is simply a planning tool but it helps the staff arrange activities in time, space and purpose in order to achieve greater synergy between core and IO functions. This matrix could augment the IO annex to a campaign plan and provide specific guidance for the tasking of units conducting IO activities (i.e. PSYOP, CA, PA, and EW units).

This matrix is very similar to the type of IO synchronization matrix the 1<sup>st</sup> ID used to integrate IO into their peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>126</sup> However, this planning tool is oriented more at the operational level of war and on integration/orchestration rather than detailed synchronization. The basic purpose of the matrix is to identify IO functions that can support the attack, control, or protection of a particular decisive point and operational objectives. This creates a linkage from the very top of the operational design, the center of gravity, all the way down to specific IO functions.

The matrix helps demonstrate some of the advantages of using IO in a peace operation. First, information operations can add significantly to the core function *Strike*. *Strike* activities are typically associated with the use of physical force. Since physical force is severely restricted in a peace operation, there are only a couple of activities indicated in the *Strike* column leaving much room for IO to add to the effort.

<b>Decisive Point: Control Military Functions</b>				
<b>Objectives:</b> 1. Monitor/Control External Support, 2. Monitor/Control Internal Support, 3. Monitor/Control Leadership, 4. Monitor/Enforce Weapons and Equipment Cantonment, 4. Monitor Troop Movement & Activity, 5. Identify/Monitor Intelligence Systems 6. Establish/Control ZOS				
<b>Core Functions</b>		<b>Information Operations</b>		
<b>Events and Activities</b>		<b>Perception Management</b>	<b>Information Degradation &amp; Denial</b>	<b>Information Exploitation</b>
<b>SENSE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify and monitor key faction leaders</li> <li>Analyze/monitor faction intelligence systems</li> <li>Identify location of forces &amp; equipment</li> <li>Monitor movement of factions and equipment</li> <li>Determine sources of faction support</li> <li>Develop HUMINT contacts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct PSYOP to de-legitimize belligerent faction leaders</li> <li>Conduct EW to gather intel from faction information systems</li> <li>CA teams survey populace about attitudes toward faction leaders, peacekeepers, US</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protect friendly info systems from unauthorized access</li> <li>Use EW and OPSEC to counter faction intelligence gathering efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Release Recon/Surveillance video and imagery to media to de-legitimize belligerent factions</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>React to treaty violations</li> <li>Control riots as required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct PSYOP and PA to counter negative reactions to employment of QRF and to de-legitimize the violators/rioters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct selective EW against belligerent faction C4I systems</li> <li>Conduct selective physical attack against belligerent faction C4I systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Employ rapid-reaction PSYOP teams to discourage potential rioting and ZOS violations</li> </ul>
<b>SHIELD</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Patrol ZOS</li> <li>Establish/operate checkpoints</li> <li>Conduct de-mining operations</li> <li>Provide ADA early warning</li> <li>Implement force protection measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct CA to improve local populace perception of peacekeepers</li> <li>Conduct PSYOP to highlight improvements to locals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Counter faction agitation and propaganda efforts</li> <li>Maintain OPSEC and conduct deception to cover patrol routes/times</li> <li>Protect friendly info systems from attack</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use PA and PSYOP to demonstrate US capabilities</li> <li>Use PSYOP to educate populace on ROE (right of self defense)</li> </ul>
<b>MOVE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct engineer mobility operations</li> <li>Support repatriation of refugees</li> <li>Conduct countermobility operations along ZOS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct CA/PSYOP activities to gain support of ZOS and refugee resettlement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Counter faction messages against refugee resettlement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use CA and PSYOP to help maintain order along key movement routes</li> </ul>
<b>SUSTAIN</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide logistic support to forces</li> <li>Provide emergency potable water to civilians</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct public/mass media information ops to highlight improvements</li> <li>Conduct command info program to sustain morale</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain OPSEC over logistics routes, resupply times</li> <li>Protect logistics info systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct deception operations to cover friendly log activities</li> <li>Provide PA coverage of emergency potable water supply</li> </ul>
<b>CONTROL</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide C2 over deployed forces</li> <li>Coordinate/attend Joint Military Councils</li> <li>Coordinate w/coalition forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PA coverage of Joint Military Councils to increase legitimacy of peace op</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain OPSEC over coalition activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide email and internet support to coalition forces</li> </ul>

**Figure 8: Information Operations Integration Matrix**



Information operations provide the non-lethal *Strike* functions that will help lead to the successful control of that decisive point.

Information operations also help counter some of the potential negative effects produced by physical strike operations. Looking again at the *Strike* row we see that activities within the perception management IO function offset the negative side effects of the core function activities. The PSYOPs and PA efforts are aimed at countering negative perceptions and attitudes that might form internally or externally as a result of having to use force to control the military factions. This reduces the overall risk of using physical force and gives the commander more options in executing his mission.

Finally, IO provides its own opportunities as depicted in the "Information Exploitation" column. Core *Sensing* functions such as reconnaissance and surveillance provide an opportunity to exploit information and use it to the advantage of the peace operation force. Releasing imagery and video showing ZOS violations to the media discredits the offending faction and its leaders. Knowledge of this capability will help discourage future violations thereby reducing the need to deploy a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to physically stop a violation.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Dennis Steele, "The 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR in Bosnia," *Army Magazine*, Vol. 48, No. 2, February 1998, 41.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Marshall Harris, "A fractured land: a history of the Balkan Conflict," MSNBC News, [audio recording on-line]; available at <http://www.msnbc.com/modules/bosnia/yugomap.asp>; Internet; accessed on 31 January 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Susan Woodward, "A fractured land: a history of the Balkan Conflict," MSNBC News, [audio recording on-line]; available at <http://www.msnbc.com/modules/bosnia/yugomap.asp>; Internet; accessed on 31 January 1998.

<sup>5</sup> "TF Eagle mission statement", *Task Force Eagle Web Site*, available at <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/Mission.htm>, accessed 9 March 1998.

<sup>6</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Murphy, "Information Operations on the Nontraditional Battlefield," *Military Review*, Vol. 77, No. 6, November-December 1996, 17. In stressing the importance of often overlooked specialties like public affairs, civil affairs, and psychological operations on nontraditional battlefields, LTC Murphy states "The commander must turn to the previously neglected arrows in his quiver of assets to complement these lethal means." LTC Murphy is a strong advocate of using information operations to enhance unit effectiveness when operating on these "nontraditional battlefields." He argues that in these environments, the populace's perceptions are the true center of gravity (p. 16) and that information operations offer the commander the tools to attack this nontraditional center of gravity. This monograph will elaborate on the concept of centers of gravity in peace operations and specifically how information operations can be used against them.

<sup>7</sup> J. V. Gray (Principal Investigator), *Information Operations: A Research Aid*, (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, September 1997), 5.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., A-3

<sup>10</sup> Joint Pub. 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Preliminary Coordinating Draft, (Washington DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 Jan 98), 3-13 – 3-14.

<sup>11</sup> The Dictionary of War Quotations, edited by Justin Wintle, (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 21.

<sup>12</sup> Riverside Webster's II Dictionary, revised edition, s.v. "cybernetics." (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1996), 174.

<sup>13</sup> FM 100-5, Operations (Revised Final Draft), (Washington DC: Headquarter Department of the Army, 6 April 1998), 2-6.

<sup>14</sup> James J. Schneider, Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School for Advanced Military Studies, 1 March 1988), 6.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>16</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994), 33-36. FM 100-23 includes use of force and force protection in Chapter 3- Planning Considerations. This chapter also discusses force training (briefly), force tailoring, public affairs and legal issues. The chapter on planning does not discuss military theory directly and does not identify the domains of conflict. Therefore, this section of the monograph presents these concepts to spread the focus beyond the typical physical domain of conventional operations.

<sup>17</sup> Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

<sup>18</sup> Quote by MG McKenzie in Lessons Learned Report: Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Lessons Learned, December 1995), 11.

<sup>19</sup> "Serbs Stone NATO Troops," ABCNEWS.com Web Site, available online at <http://archive.abcnews.com/sections/world/bosnia901/index.html>, accessed April 13, 1998. The violence occurred in Brcko and was a result of a violent power struggle between Bosnian Serb factions. One Serb faction was using the radio stations to broadcast messages aimed at undermining the peace effort and discrediting the peacekeeping force. The crowds threw rocks at the US peacekeepers, seriously injuring some. When it was seen that conventional use of force only antagonized the situation, US forces used electronic warfare to block the offensive broadcasts.

<sup>20</sup> "NATO Halts Serb Broadcasts," ABCNEWS.com Web Site, available online at <http://archive.abcnews.com/sections/world/bosnia101/index.html>, accessed on April 13, 1998.

<sup>21</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 106.

<sup>22</sup> LTC Walter E. Kretchik, "Force Protection Disparities," Military Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, July-August 1997, 75-76. LTC Kretchik examines the force protection issues during Operation Joint Endeavor. He faults convoluted chains of command, turf battles, and personality conflicts as the major sources of disparity in force protection assessments. LTC Kretchik seems to side with many of the other NATO allies who believe that US force protection measures detract from the political objectives of peace operations- to instill an atmosphere of normalcy.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 76. This was the viewpoint of the British ARRC commander in Sarajevo.

<sup>24</sup> Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 1996), 77.

<sup>25</sup> Personal note. As MG Kinzer's Aide de Camp in Haiti from Feb-Oct 1995, I would take him to the weekly radio broadcasts. The US public affairs officer would provide topics for discussion and MG Kinzer would take it from there.

<sup>26</sup> Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 79-80.

<sup>27</sup> Clausewitz, On War, 76 and 88. These classic ideas come from book one on the nature of war. Clausewitz highlighted the passionate nature of war later in his paradoxical trinity that links the emotional side of war with rationality and chance (p. 89).

<sup>28</sup> FM 100-5, Operations (Revised Final Draft), 2-11.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>30</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 18.

<sup>31</sup> Brian Cloughley, "Peace in Mind: Will the UN give PSYOPS a chance?," *Jane's International Defense Review*, Vol. 29, March 1996, 60.

<sup>32</sup> Mary Pat Kelly, "Rescue: Out of Bosnia," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 121, No. 7, July 1995, 52.

<sup>33</sup> Initial Impressions Volume III: Haiti (The US Army and UN Peacekeeping), (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), July 1995), 161.

<sup>34</sup> Colonel Ardant du Picq, "Battle Studies", Roots of Strategy, Book 2, translated by Colonel John N. Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton, (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 135.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

<sup>36</sup> Initial Impressions Volume III: Haiti (The US Army and UN Peacekeeping), (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), July 1995), 95.

<sup>37</sup> FM 100-5 (Revised Final Draft), 2-13.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-6.

<sup>39</sup> Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Lessons Learned, May 1996), 62.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Foreign Policy Association, "Media's Role in Shaping Foreign Policy," *Great Decisions*, 1991, 87-94.

<sup>42</sup> Stephen Badsey, Modern Military Operations and the Media, *Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper No. 8*, (Camberley, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 18.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 21. Badsey lists six principles of military-media relations in his study on current trends between these two groups. The principles are: The propaganda of facts (an official statement should never contain a conscious lie but there is no obligation to volunteer specific information), information must wait upon policy (information strategy is dictated by broader political and military strategy), public relations is a command function (commanders must keep their media relations staff fully aware of what is happening, and must be aware of the media implications of their actions), co-operate rather than censor (media relations work better by treating the media as allies rather than enemies), silence breeds speculation (cutting off information will not restrict the news flow...telling the media nothing only forces them to guess, and they will often guess right), propaganda destroys credibility (the public affairs team should not engage in PSYOPs with the media).

<sup>44</sup> Author's personal photograph taken in Port au Prince, Haiti 30 March 1995.

<sup>45</sup> Steve Komarow, "Haiti Nears Elections Amid Hints of a Need for Longer U.N. Stay," *USA Today*, Tuesday, June 20, 1995, available online at <http://archives.usatoday.com>; accessed 12 April, 1998.

<sup>46</sup> Personal observation while performing duties as MG Kinzer's Aide de Camp in Haiti. MG Kinzer's public affairs officer briefed him prior to every interview. The PAO gave background information on the reporter if it was available and indicated the types of questions the reporter might ask. This PAO effort

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along with MG Kinzer's experience in dealing with the media helped ensure that the majority of the media coverage on UNMIH sent a good message back home.

<sup>47</sup> Initial Impressions Report: Haiti (The US Army and UN Peacekeeping), (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), December 1994), 93.

<sup>48</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, December 1994), vi.

<sup>49</sup> Clausewitz, On War, 606-607.

<sup>50</sup> Joint Pub. 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 Feb 1995), 3-1.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> John T. Fishel, Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 8.

<sup>53</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 16.

<sup>54</sup> "United Nations Security Council Resolution 940", *United Nations Web Site*, available on the Internet at [http://www.undp.org/un/un\\_docs.html](http://www.undp.org/un/un_docs.html), accessed 14 March 1998.

<sup>55</sup> FM 101-5-1: Operational Terms and Graphics, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 30 September 1997), 1-34.

<sup>56</sup> Kevin C. M. Benson and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," *Parameters*, Autumn 1996, 71.

<sup>57</sup> Michael Howard, Clausewitz, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 39.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> US Department of Defense Dictionary, s.v. "center of gravity," (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 14 March 1997), 87.

<sup>60</sup> See FM 100-23, Peace Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 1994), 16-18. Unity of effort and legitimacy are two of the principles of peace operations identified in FM 100-23. The others include security, restraint and objective.

<sup>61</sup> Rick Brennan and R. Evan Ellis, Information Warfare in Multilateral Peace Operations: A Case Study of Somalia, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment, 18 April 1996), 7.

<sup>62</sup> Major Robin P. Swan, The Pieces of a Military Chessboard- What is the Contemporary Significance of Jomini's Design of a Theater of Operations?, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1991), 32.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, Revised Final Draft, 2-37.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 2-38.

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 2-38.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 2-41.

<sup>69</sup> Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

<sup>70</sup> Staff Sergeant Richard A. Sizer, "Land Information Warfare Activity," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*; available online at <http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/school/dotd/mipb/sizer.html>, accessed on 30 March 1998, 1.

<sup>71</sup> FM 100-6, Information Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 1996), B-3.

<sup>72</sup> Sizer, "Land Information Warfare Activity," 2.

<sup>73</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Shanahan (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, "Information Operations in Bosnia," *Military Review*, Vol. 77, No. 6, November-December 1997, 3-4; available online at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/sha1c.html>, accessed 2 March 1998.

<sup>74</sup> FM 100-6, Information Operations, 6-6. This manual states that the exact organization of the IO battle staff is the prerogative of the commander (p. D-0). However, Appendix D describes in detail a recommended organization for a formal IO battle staff. Chapter six identifies three basic techniques for integrating IO into the battle staff. The first is to integrate IO into existing staff organizations and functions...in other words, spread the IO requirement throughout the existing staff organization. The second technique is to create a process-oriented, or ad-hoc group similar to a targeting cell that plans and coordinates IO activities within the organization. The third recommendation is a dedicated IO battle staff to integrate IO functions.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 6-7.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., D-1. Figure D-2 describes the composition of the IO battle staff.

<sup>78</sup> Joint Pub. 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Preliminary Coordinating Draft, (Washington DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 Jan 98), IV-3.

<sup>79</sup> Milton D. Rosenau, Jr., Successful Project Management: A Step-by-Step Approach with Practical Examples, Second Edition, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1992), 155.

<sup>80</sup> See the *Center For Army Lessons Learned Web Site*, available at [http://call.army.mil/call/ctc\\_bull/bctp](http://call.army.mil/call/ctc_bull/bctp), for US Army Combat Training Center trends. Staff integration has been a frequent "needs improvement" item in the Combat Training Center trends bulletins. Specific mention of lack of staff integration is found in the Battle Command Training Program Training Trends for FY 95 under C2 Battlefield Operating System Trends (TA.4, II-12), available at [http://call/army.mil/call/ctc\\_bull/bctp1/sec2ta4.htm#DECISIONS](http://call/army.mil/call/ctc_bull/bctp1/sec2ta4.htm#DECISIONS), accessed 2 April, 98.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 6-6.

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<sup>82</sup> LTC Stephen W. Shanahan and LTC Garry J. Beavers, "Information Operations in Bosnia," *Military Review*, Vol. 77, No. 6, November-December 1997, 3; available online at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/sha1c.html>.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>84</sup> Milton D. Rosenau, Jr., Successful Project Management, 156.

<sup>85</sup> FM 100-15, Corps Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 1996, 2-25.

<sup>86</sup> FM 100-6, Information Operations, 6-5.

<sup>87</sup> Rick Brennan and R. Evan Ellis, Information Warfare in Multilateral Peace Operations: A Case Study of Somalia, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment, 18 April 1996), 2.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>89</sup> Author's personal observation of engineer efforts around the town of Jacmel in spring and summer of 1995. United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) engineer units designed the bridges so that they would require a great deal of manual labor from the local populace. The engineers hired civilians to gather rocks to build gabions and conduct other construction tasks. The engineer unit gained valuable training and helped restore a major economic thoroughfare to the region.

<sup>90</sup> Brennan and Ellis, 9.

<sup>91</sup> Task Force Eagle's *Talon Online* web site is available at, <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/talon/index.html>, accessed on 4 April 1998.

<sup>92</sup> Brennan and Ellis, 18.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>94</sup> FM 100-5, Operations (Revised Final Draft), 2-56.

<sup>95</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 30 September 1997), 1-24.

<sup>96</sup> James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity," *Parameters*, September 1987, 50.

<sup>97</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-26.

<sup>98</sup> FM 100-6, Information Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1996), Glossary-3.

<sup>99</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-35.

<sup>100</sup> FM 100-5, Operations (Revised Final Draft), 2-9 and 2-56.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-12.

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<sup>102</sup> "NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 4: NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia," available online at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/bpfy.htm>., accessed 13 April 1998.

<sup>103</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-46.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-59.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-60.

<sup>106</sup> Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Preliminary Coordination), (Washington DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 January 1998, 1-9.

<sup>107</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-82.

<sup>108</sup> FM 100-6, Information Operations, B-3.

<sup>109</sup> FM 100-5, Operations (Revised Final Draft), 2-38.

<sup>110</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-45.

<sup>111</sup> FM 100-5, Operations (Revised Final Draft), 2-11.

<sup>112</sup> Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action, Armed Forces, (Washington DC: (Washington DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 February 1995).

<sup>113</sup> "NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 4: NATO's Role to Bringing Peace in the Former Yugoslavia," available online at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/bpfy.htm>., accessed 13 April 1998.

<sup>114</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-110.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-124.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-111.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-116.

<sup>118</sup> FM 100-5, Operations (Revised Final Draft), 2-8.

<sup>119</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-125.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-135.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-152.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-153.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-164.



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<sup>125</sup> This chart was provided by COL John Lewis, director of the Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, KS. COL Lewis was a member of the USACOM planning team during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY.

<sup>126</sup> See Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Shanahan (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, "Information Operations in Bosnia," *Military Review*, Vol. 77, No. 6, November-December 1997, 5; available online at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/sha1c.html>, accessed 2 March 1998. The authors describe their IO implementation matrix as a tool for synchronizing and deconflicting IO activities with other military activities. The key difference between 1<sup>st</sup> ID's IO synchronization matrix and the one described in this monograph is that 1<sup>st</sup> ID's did not define any linkage to decisive points or objectives. It was used more as a low-level tool for monitoring IO implementation. The matrix designed in this paper is primarily intended to integrate IO into the overall operational design and provide complimentary effects for the core battlefield functions.